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Abstract
This article summarizes some of the contributions of
feminist science scholars in order to explore the
possibilities of a critical science of sex, gender, and
sexuality, and suggests the radical possibilities of
"invested empirical research methods" - investigative
approaches grounded in both scientific method and an
interest in social justice.
Résumé
Cet article fait le sommaire de certaines contributions
de spécialistes de la science féministe afin d'explorer les
possibilités d'une science critique sur le sexe, sur le
genre et la sexualité, et suggère les possibilités radicales
des « méthodes de recherches empiriques investies » -
rechercher des approches basées sur la méthode
scientifique et sur un intérêt pour la justice sociale.
Introduction
Clinical research on sex and gender differences
has long interested the popular press and captured
public imaginations. Mainstream representations of this
research focus on subjects such as "brain sex" along
with hormonal and/or genetic configurations as a means
to explain bodily and gender differences and
relationships, as well as sexual behaviour. Using
language such as "hard-wired," "programmed" and
"inborn" to suggest biological constraints, these
popularized biological explanations typically confirm the
social status quo, engage in speculative generalization,
and/or reduce complex phenomena to a single element
or cause. For example, the current best-seller The
Female Brain, written by a clinical professor of
psychiatry, contains statements such as, "Baby girls are
born interested in emotional expression…It's the same
kind of instinct that keeps a grown woman going after
a narcissistic or otherwise emotionally unavailable man -
'if I just do it right, he'll love me'" (Brizendine 2006).
These images represent men and women as
close to debilitated by their innate biological blueprints
and shambling like single-minded, dimly conscious robots
towards their respective, heteronormative sex-based
destinies. Choice, chance, adaptation, diversity and
variation, social structures, power imbalances, lived
inequalities, and a host of other elements (including,
frequently, evidence to support such claims) are absent
from what feminist evolutionary biologist Patricia Adair
Gowaty terms "just-so" stories (Gould and Lewontin
1979; Gowaty 2003). Such stories also, typically, reduce
"difference" to sex-gender difference alone (Seitler
2004). While popular representations of scientific
findings do not necessarily represent the nuances of the
original research, and in fact may get the clinical
findings entirely wrong, such representations are part of
the discursive and epistemic environment in which
clinical research is produced. A larger public concern
with sex differences, and the legitimacy and
"naturalness" of these differences, provides the milieu
in which clinical research is performed, the epistemic
validation for this research, and the grounds to
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speculate on the significance of research conclusions
(van den Wijngaard 1997). Given the public interest in
and the dubious quality of much of popular science
writing on sex and gender, we have to inquire into why
and how sex, gender, and sexual differences become the
sites of inquiry, and who benefits from them?
Feminist and other social justice-oriented
scholars have critiqued the ideological currents both
within scientific practice and mainstream representation,
as well as the processes of knowledge production in the
biological sciences.  However, this scholarship contains a1
number of gaps. First, particularly within work based in
the social sciences and humanities, the body as body
has largely gone missing, leaving only the imprint of its
discursive figuration. While theorists have made sound
critiques of the ways in which bodies and biology are
represented in cultural products, psychoanalytic
imaginings, and language (Bordo 1993; Butler 1993;
Grosz 1995), there has been little discussion of the
"meat" itself. "Bodies that matter" (to use Judith
Butler's famous expression) have rarely, in fact, had
much matter at all, and "feminists often approach
analyses of matter both reluctantly and negatively"
(Birke 1999; Hird 2003, 449). 
Second, although much feminist and queer
scholarship deconstructs and attempts to enhance
empiricist work on sex, gender and sexuality with
qualitative insights (Warner 2004), much less research
goes in the other direction or uses peer-reviewed
research from biological disciplines. Many scholars and
activists concerned with equity and social justice have
been quick to dismiss biological theories as essentialist
and/or determinist, although some have taken the
opposite approach, using biological "explanations" as
political linchpins (Hird 2003). In either case, human
physiology is understood frequently as a crude structure
with limited possibilities for change or variation.
Pointing to biological structures as players in human
behaviours and identities may be seen as a reductionist
move that excludes social context and limits complex
phenomena to simple linear processes such as the
inevitable and one-way behavioural action of a single
brain region, hormone or gene. Yet this view of
physiology runs counter to actual clinical evidence and
work in a variety of fields such as anatomy and
molecular biology, which demonstrate that although
many structures are organized by a few simple rules,
the systems are nevertheless often highly variable,
complex and plastic (Fausto-Sterling 2005; Wilson 1998
and 2004). 
Third, feminist scholars have often been
hesitant to use empirical methods, arguing that they are
based on an approach that, in its focus on
measurement and detached analysis of observable
phenomena, disregards things that cannot be quantified
(and does not critically analyze the process of
quantification itself); ignores social context; and by
definition excludes marginalized knowers who are seen
as irrational and/or biased (Code 1991; Haraway 1996;
Harding 1998). Moreover, feminist and queer scholars
have pointed out that ostensibly neutral forms of data
collection are in fact loaded with cultural baggage
(Klement and simpkins 2004). Not only does this data
collection privilege particular forms of social
organization, it cannot account for people who do not
fit its parameters. 
Yet a large-scale rejection of empirical
methods and biological sciences limits the tools available
to progressive scholars. It fails to consider the other
important elements of the scientific method, such as
repeatability, testability, and public scrutiny of ideas and
findings. It leaves us unable to critique clinical research
on its own terms or to respond to conservative forces
who would use quantitative data as ammunition for
regressive policy. Given the discursive power of science
to explain the world and shape institutional practices,
this is a crucial oversight on our parts. An
anti-empirical stance deprives scholars committed to
social justice of powerful tools for collecting and
disseminating evidence about the value and extent of
human sex, gender, and sexual variation. An
anti-biological approach in a social context where
biological data carries great social and political weight
leaves the foxes guarding the henhouse.
In this article I will summarize some of the
contributions of feminist science scholars in order to
explore the possibilities of a critical science of sex,
gender, and sexuality. This exploration presents the
biological body both as material body and as an entity
containing potential for progressive sexuality studies. It
also suggests the radical possibilities of "invested
empirical research methods" - investigative approaches
grounded in both scientific method and an interest in
social justice. 
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Sex + Gender = Sexuality?
One can say very little about the biological
representations of sexuality without also speaking of sex
and gender. Sex is generally understood by biologists as
either defined by gametes (Roughgarden 2004) or a
broader collection of morphological characteristics such
as chromosomes and reproductive organs, that when
evaluated as a whole are assigned the label of "male"
or "female" (Fausto-Sterling 2000). In humans,
biological sex is usually male or female, but various
forms of intersexuality may occur in as much as 2
percent of the population (Blackless et al. 2000).
Biologists may understand gender in a limited sense as
the presentation of sexed and sexual features; thus, fish,
birds and other animals may be said to have genders,
and often more than two (Roughgarden 2004). In
human terms, gender has a number of dimensions such
as gender identity, role, attribution, and presentation
(MacDonald 1998). Sex and gender may be understood
slightly, yet significantly, differently by researchers in
different scientific fields. Thus, although these terms are
loosely organized and roughly coherent, given their
variation in the natural world as well as the disciplinary
heterogeneity of their conceptualization, the three
dimensions of sex, gender, and sexuality resist
oversimplification.
Despite the evidence in favour of a broad
understanding of human sexuality, in fields such as
evolutionary biology sexuality has been framed largely
in binary terms and as a reproductive equation of sex
and gender. Within such framing social inequalities and
cultural organization in both humans and animals
emerges from "natural" biological differences between
masculine, sexually aggressive males and "coy" feminine
females in the pursuit of gamete negotiation (Fehr
2004; Gowaty 2003; Hrdy 1986). So framed "sexuality"
is taken-for-granted and rarely defined or interrogated
(Gagnon 2004). Much less has been said scientifically
about the often-complicated and contradictory elements
of pleasure, desire, eroticism, passion, or romantic love,
except perhaps as viewed through the lens of sexual
deviance, which focuses on "paraphilias" and their
intersection with gender transgression (Fagan 1994;
Lawrence 2004). Heterosexual, middle-class, Western
Anglocentric sexual ideals are taken to be universal
norms despite abundant comparative data from other
fields, such as anthropology, which observe a variety of
human sexual practices, biological sexes, and gender
identities (Blackwood and Wieringa 1999; Herdt 1998).
Normative sexual ideals persist, despite the fact that
Western Anglo society itself consistently fails to live up
to them. Indeed, many studies attempt to delineate
"true" or "authentic" sex, gender, and sexual
configurations, choose select study populations to
represent these, and explain away or erase the infinite
number of exceptions in their data.  Because in many2
cases the methods themselves are faulty, and the
evidence does not support many of the studies'
conclusions or applications, feminist critique of these
works would be enhanced by researchers' engagement
with the empirical bases of the scholarship.
Variance in sex, gender, and sexuality is
relatively common, and the concept of "variation,"
particularly as it is used in scientific discourse, is
relatively benign. Unlike "variation," "deviance" has
generally negative connotations. It is through the
conceptual lens of "deviance" that many forms of sex,
gender, and sexual variation are understood. Deviance
both names variation and pronounces judgment about
variation's relationship to the norm. Thus, deviance
suggests a phenomenon that may be understood as an
error, a divergence that is problematic for normative
social values or biological taxonomies, or both. Deviance
is the term frequently used to conflate biological
variation and social judgements of such variation. While
deviation from a racialized sexual norm of monogamous
state-sanctioned heterosexuality may be a social
problem, or not, it is not a deviation in a biological
sense. Similarly, people whose gender identity does not
match the gender assigned at birth may be assumed to
be biologically variant, or socially judged as sexually
pathological (Blanchard 1989; Chivers and Bailey 2000;
Muscarella et al. 2001). Yet this is not an inevitable
consequence of biological research. Other work such as
Lippa's (2000) on gender traits of gays and lesbians
provides a counterpoint to this approach. While Lippa
is able to identify collective average tendencies in the
chosen gender-typed activities of people who self-identify
as gay or lesbian, he is also careful to point out that
the "results do not imply that gay men are like women
or that lesbian women are like men" (923, italics in
original). Lippa is able to draw conclusions about a
population without over-generalizing. He cautiously
replicates studies with large sample sizes. He provides
heterosexual controls; identifies divergence and variation
within and between sample populations; emphasizes the
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multiple dimensions of gender performance (as well as
indicating minimal differences); incorporates a
methodological critique of the measurement techniques
used; and indicates the limits of the research. 
There is compelling evidence that physiological
features participate in shaping identities and behaviours
throughout people's lives. For instance, the chemical
basis of some mental illnesses, or the behavioural and
cognitive changes from brain injury, is well documented.
Considering a biological contribution to sex, gender, and
sexual identity does not render a theory reductionist.
Rather, problems emerge when nonharmful deviation is
regarded as an error; when theoretical models do not
accurately reflect practical complexity; when causality is
misattributed and/or correlation spurious; when norms
of body, behaviour and identity are derived from false
universals; and when research with social and political
consequences is produced without thoughtful
consideration of context. Researchers must develop
theories of the complex phenomena that make up sex,
gender, and sexuality that are self-reflexive (i.e., they
are self-conscious and critical about conceptualization
and methods of inquiry), evidence-based, testable and
robust. Outcomes must be repeatable in subsequent
studies; reflective of the scope of human variation while
cognizant of unifying elements; and be aware of the
situated and context-based nature of inquiry as well as
of the power dimensions that shape the research
process specifically and society more broadly. 
Knowing Bodies
Reluctance to use empirical methods and to
engage with clinical evidence is not a universal tendency
in equity-oriented scholarship. Feminist scientists have
made significant contributions to the practice and
production of scientific knowledge, particularly pertaining
to biological research on sex, gender, and sexuality.
Although they draw on a number of scientific fields
including primatology (Hrdy, Haraway), endocrinology
(Oudshoorn, van den Wijngaard), cell biology (Martin),
evolutionary biology (Gowaty), physics (Fox Keller),
molecular biology (Spanier), morphology (Fausto-Sterling),
neuroscience (Wilson), ecology (Roughgarden),
biochemistry (Hubbard), occupational health (Messing),
etc., feminist critiques of scientific knowledge production
have focused on a few key areas, which I will
summarize briefly here (Harding 1998; Messing 1999;
Nielsen 1990; van den Wijngard 1997). 
First, feminist critques have reiterated that
science is a social, and often a public, project (Cassidy
2006; Laslett et al. 1996). Although science is
commonly seen as the "objective" accumulation of
"facts," data collection alone is only one part of the
research process. Knowledge of all types is not only
provisional but relational (Code 1991). Facts do not
speak for themselves. Even if we accept the notion that
data collection is objective (which I do not), a scholarly
study requires context, synthesis, and interpretation,
which is largely a social and political endeavour. Second,
feminists have examined methodological issues in
knowledge production, including what questions are
asked (or not) in research and how, who is studied
(and by whom), how the answers are interpreted and
causality attributed, and how conclusions are
extrapolated (Harding 1998; Schiebinger 2004). This
includes the primary conditions of the studies
themselves; the conditions under which research is
produced and circulated; how findings are accepted (or
not) by a wider scientific community; how findings are
publicized in science presses; and finally, how findings
are publicized in mainstream presses, which, like a
game of "broken telephone," may have very little to do
with the original study results (Rolin 2004). A third line
of critical analysis explores the conceptual structures,
such as language, that organize research and make it
intelligible both to other researchers as well as the
general public.
One of the simplest yet most provocative
methodological and epistemological questions feminists
have asked is "What do we know?" (Code 1991).
Feminists have challenged much that is taken for
granted, arguing that "common sense" assumptions
often inadvertently structure research design and
outcomes. What "everyone knows" is frequently wrong,
or entirely unsupported by experimental evidence, but
"everyone" continues to "know" this simply because it
seems logical in a certain social context. Although many
scientists are well aware that facts about sex, gender,
and sexual binaries are not so clear-cut, and
experimental evidence is piling up to refute such claims
(Fausto-Sterling 2000; Hubbard 1996; Weasel 2001),
common knowledge may continue to organize primary
research, and public representation of its findings. As
Gowaty points out, "The 'facts' about males and females
have been so intuitively obvious that only a few have
ever asked if the 'facts' were correct" (2003, 906). 
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Often the data is available to researchers but
they choose not to see it, or to interpret it in ways
that are most comfortable and least disconcerting to
dominant social agendas. For instance, speaking of the
sexual behaviour of chimpanzees, Tuana (2004) writes
that despite abundant evidence of non-monogamous,
pleasure-oriented, and same-sex pairing, as well as
orgasm in some primates, evolutionary theorists
observing the behaviour often choose to present
conclusions "right out of a Norman Rockwell painting"
(222). Rachel Maines' (1999) delightful work on the
development of the vibrator observes that nineteenth
century doctors who induced orgasm via manual genital
stimulation to treat their female patients' nervous
disorders could not believe that the "hysterical
paroxysms" generated could be sexual in origin - after
all, women were supposed to be naturally chaste.
Biologist Joan Roughgarden adds that in performing her
own research into the "evolution's rainbow," she
wondered why "nature's wonderful diversity in gender
and sexuality," such as elaborate, highly social, and
complex mating behaviours (often involving three or
more animal genders), was not better known. She
concludes that not only do academic disciplines
themselves discriminate against diversity, but also
suggests that "all our academic disciplines should go
back to school, take refresher courses in their own
primary data, and emerge with a reformed, enlarged,
and more accurate concept of diversity" (Roughgarden
2004, 3; Weasel 2001).
Moreover, focusing on sexual difference as the
central mode of difference between erases the vast
differences within sexes and genders. It also erases
variation among all humans based on other biological
factors such as age, familial history and kinship group,
disease and health, ability, and the physiological
markers of growth, development, and daily life in
particular environments. Other physiological factors such
as skin colour or body size may be less significant to
human organisms on their own, but may become highly
significant when put into a social context. 
Biological configurations can be more
complicated than social values allow for. Biological study
does not necessarily simplify the world - it can increase
its richness, complexity, and diversity. Binaries,
reductionism, or oversimplification may be no more
correct or appropriate in biological than in sociological
research. In both fields the data often simply do not
support such conclusions. And yet, as Roughgarden
(2004) points out, non-scientists hear little of this
reality of biological study.
Deviation is Standard
"We call contrary to nature what happens
contrary to custom; nothing is anything but
according to nature, whatever it may be."  
     Michel de Montaigne, 1595
Because biological sciences ask and answer
questions about "real life," scientific explanations for
behaviours and identities evolve and interact with
political, social, and economic currents (Haraway 1996).
Within biology, material and symbolic dramas of race,
sexuality, gender, the state, the family, and class are
played out upon the "body of nature." Biological
sciences also have significant practical and ideological
power to explain the world. Feminist biologist Ruth
Hubbard notes that it is a truism that because of its
"rigorous objectivity, science reveals the Truth about
Nature" (1996, 157). And yet, she adds, biases are
most invisible and stubborn in questions about human
existence, particularly when it comes to issues of sex,
gender, and sexuality.
While no field of research is monolithic, and
debate within scientific communities is always active,
broad historical trends can be distinguished nevertheless.
One of the grounding assumptions of Western scientific
thought is the idea that all organisms fit into a larger
system; and moreover, that scholars can identify and
delineate things that are "normal" from things that are
"deviant." "Normal" can be understood as simply that
which is commonplace. However, "normal" can also be
an ideological judgement and means of representing
what is socially acceptable and desirable. Things that
are not numerically common can be viewed as
ideologically "normal," such as left-handedness. On the
other hand, entire groups have been, and continue to
be, excluded from "normal" even if they are present in
large numbers; common behaviours can be excluded
from what is considered normal, if people are not
willing to admit to their prevalence. 
Although variation is well-acknowledged in
biological research, the conceptual schema of "normal"
and "deviant" still organizes a great deal of work on
sexuality. As biologist Joan Roughgarden writes, "In
molecular biology and medicine, diversity is
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pathologized; difference is considered a disease"(2004,
3). And yet variation persists. Humans insist on climbing
out of their categories. Indeed, thanks to the Internet,
the past decade has seen a virtual explosion of
information about non-normative sex, gender, sexual
practices and identities (and enthusiastic networking
among those so identified). Indeed sexologists, even in
the 1960s, could scarcely have imagined its scale. How,
asks Roughgarden, "does biology account for such a
huge population that doesn't match the template science
teaches as normal?" (2004, 1) Her response is simple:
poorly and inaccurately. "When scientific theory says
something's wrong with so many people," she writes,
"perhaps the theory is wrong, not the people" (2004,
1). 
Although knowledge production and its
representation intersects with social, political, and
economic anxieties, normality and deviance are
frequently seen as biological properties of individuals
rather than concepts with a social and political basis.
Scientists have often hunted for signs of racialized and
classed sexual deviance and "degeneracy" written on
the body, including studies of breasts (Schiebinger
2004), skulls (Schiebinger 2004), arm length, jaw
structure, genitals (Tuana 2004), and hand structure
(Seitler 2004) or preference (Green and Young 2001).
There is presently a certain impetus to re-inscribe
sex-gender differences and discover the "cause" of
particular sexual orientations.  Indeed genetics and/or3
neurological conditions may contribute to gender and
sexual orientation. Yet, the current framing of the issue
reflects prevailing popular notions of biological causality:
that one structure is entirely responsible for a complex
identity that is lived in a web of social relations. The
current framing of sex and gender also suggests that
biological structures are unchanging and determinative;
that biological factors work in a one-way direction (i.e.
from body to behaviour), unmediated by environment or
even other biological factors; and that physiological
"facts" preclude any further political discussion of the
lived inequalities of people. 
On the other hand, when studying sex,
gender, and sexuality, many researchers will point to
variations such as intersexuality, transsexualism, and
homosexuality as evidence that the world is a diverse
place. In this claim they would be justified, except for
two key conceptual flaws. First, the norm itself is rarely
questioned. This is like speaking of racialization without
mentioning the hegemonic power of whiteness; like
examining class without examining capital or the ruling
elite; or using "gender" to refer only to women. Such
a conceptual absence presumes that the norm is a
uniform, unvaried category consisting of perfectly sexed,
gendered, and sexually oriented individuals. It makes
invisible the power dynamics that reinforce and
reproduce a division between "norm" and "different,"
as well as the always-contingent status of people within
the "norm" category - the ways in which most
"normal" people themselves do not fit the norm. This
absence also ignores the intersections of racialization,
class, ability, age, and a host of other elements that
within a context of power inequities, fundamentally
structure who we are and what is socially valued.
Second, by generating new taxonomies of what kind of
sexes, genders, and sexualities count as diverse (and
hence subversive), activists dedicated to the expansion
of sexual categories may inadvertently repeat the errors
of those who seek to constrain sexes, genders, and
sexualities via biological normalization. The norm is left
intact as a norm, and identities constructed in
opposition to it are like a teenager rebelling against his
or her parents: despite the histrionics around the
youth's process of self-actualization, the point of
reference is still the parents. 
What is normal and what is deviant can only
be understood in dialogue. Each needs the other to
become intelligible. Holding scientific and medical
researchers accountable for their roles in defining the
norm and pathologizing difference is essential. However,
scientists interested in social justice should seek to move
beyond this dichotomy. As they work to illuminate the
richness and rightness of variation, they should also
work to critique the taken-for-grantedness of the norm.
Against Essentialism: Reclaiming Biological Diversity as
a Feminist Project
It is tempting, given the array of concerns
about knowledge production in the biological sciences,
to reject the whole soiled physiological project
altogether, and instead to turn towards the rich
tapestry of social, cultural and political discourse,
representation and interaction as a means of
understanding and questioning sex, gender, and
sexuality. It is also tempting for groups who have been
previously marginalized to find solace and the basis for
political resistance in the idea that they were "born this
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way." In both cases, human physiology is often
envisioned by non-scientists as a relatively crude
structure whose potential for change or diversity is
minimal. The idea of having a "male" or "female"
brain, or a "gay/lesbian" or "straight" gene, is fairly
straightforward: either you have it or you don't, and
that's the end of that.
Satisfying though it may be to respond with
a biological "I told you so" to conservatives who claim
that non-heterosexual, non-gender-normative behaviours
and identities are immoral lifestyle choices; this does
not eliminate the social inequalities that perpetuate the
devaluation of human variation. Indeed, biological proof
without accompanying political resistance may enable
regressive forces to attempt to eliminate "nature's
mistakes." Such a simplistic model is not supported by
the primary clinical evidence and research in many
branches of biological sciences, which demonstrate
variation, complexity and malleability in human
physiology. This evidence is both exciting and
dangerous: it provides possibilities for scholars to take
up the project of diversity and equity, all while being
well-supported by research data; it may, however, also
provide new openings for attempts to eliminate variation
as "biological errors," or to commodify yet more
elements of life. 
It is also important to note that despite what
may seem to non-scientists as an overall coherence in
systems of scientific knowledge, scientific researchers do
not always agree. Concepts, terms of reference, and
findings continue to be subject to dispute and debate
within and between scientific fields (Seitler 2004; Wylie
2000). Since, however, "scientists tend not to wash their
dirty linen in public" (Cassidy 2006, 175), researchers
who do not engage with primary data may find
themselves relying on inaccurate presentations of
biological data and theories. Feminists wary of
"scientific conspiracies" that may seem to essentialize
complex identities may themselves essentialize scientists
and their practices if they do not work directly with
such material.
A modest little piece in the Journal of
Pediatric Urology (Cheiklehard et al.), which explores the
factors involved in determining sexual and gender
identities, provides an example of what an invested
empirical approach attentive to clinical evidence but also
invested in social justice might look like. Not only do
the authors carefully explain that many factors play into
the complex processes of identity formation, they also
admit that a great number of factors operative in these
processes are "mostly unknown" (2005, 383). Even
more surprising is that they acknowledge the role of
intersex activists in getting researchers to think about
traditional practices of infant surgery to "correct"
ambiguous genitalia. "[Activists'] feedback has come to
challenge our medical dogmas," they write, which "has
led us to think that sex assignment was always a wrong
choice...we still need criteria allowing us to predict the
SI [sexual identity] correctly, but we also need to know
to what extent our decisions are wrong" (386). Such an
example of multivariate thinking, as well as empirical
humility and openness to social change via patient
response and political action, provides a role model for
other studies to emulate. 
Towards "Invested Empirical Methods"
Despite an avowed dedication to reason,
"objectivity," and cold-hearted logic, the practice of
science is riddled with passion, intuition, accidental
discoveries, hunches, and other very non-logical
elements...much like human sexuality. Non-feminist
scientific researchers have often reacted with dismissal,
defensiveness, or even hostility to feminist critiques of
their work (van den Wijngaard 1997). In part, this may
represent a response to a challenge to ideas in which
researchers are emotionally invested. As Fausto-Sterling
writes, "We all have emotional attachments to subject
matter that comprises a field we love so deeply that
have chosen to devote our entire lives to it" (2003).
Nevertheless, feminists have made some inroads. As
Gowaty attests, however, "ideas that come out of
feminism are taken seriously as long as they are
discussed in terms of their testability, which is the
hallmark of all ideas tolerated by scientists" (2003,
902). What changes "normal science," she argues, is
the "accumulation of data inconsistent with current
dominant hypotheses...the most efficient route to
changing an entrenched scientific idea lies in carefully
designed, well-controlled empirical tests" (903). 
In other words, if feminists and other social
justice-oriented researchers wish to have their concerns
addressed, they must learn to fluently speak the
language of the scientific method along with the
polyglot they have already mastered: economics, law,
political theory, psychoanalysis, cultural criticism, history,
etc. This is not to say that researchers should accept
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such a method uncritically. Indeed, one of the strengths
of feminist work in this area is its ruthless evisceration
and careful reconstruction of all the truisms that
non-feminist researchers hold dear. Still, we need clinical
evidence. We need empirical data. We need controls
and careful observation and well-substantiated,
thoughtful conclusions that unambiguously demonstrate
the diversity and richness of humanity that we already
know intuitively to exist (or, perhaps, conclusions that
also reject many of our own cherished assumptions). As
long as feminists "are armed predominantly with
critique," and cannot produce alternatives to traditional
models, "feminist scholars of science will continue to be
perceived as anti-science, and the prospects for a
re/constructed feminist science will remain a distant,
blurry vision" (Weasel 2001, 28). This empirical focus
and method is not the only tool in our toolbox, nor
should it be, but it is a good one. We need to address
research that affects our lives on its own terms, and
move towards making those terms our own. We cannot
afford to dismiss such work as evidence of a nebulous
scientific conspiracy. Even scientists working in the same
lab cannot agree with one another. Scientific discourse
is shaped by debate, diversity, and disagreement, and
we can intervene as long as the terms of engagement
are mutually accepted and we do not lose sight of the
goal: science as an emancipatory project. Rather than a
limitation or a failing of science, the inherent
"imperfection of scientific knowledge" is also an
invitation to us: to collect more puzzle pieces, to
deepen understanding, and/or to challenge and debate
"common knowledge" (Gilbert and Fausto-Sterling 2003,
242). 
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Endnotes
1. In this article I will assume that feminist, queer,
anti-racist, and trans-positive scholarship share similar
goals of social justice. While I recognize that there is
dissent and debate among streams of thought, for the
purposes of this article I will assume that we are
working towards shared ends: namely, the elimination
of multiple and interlocking oppressions. I use the term
"progressive scholarship" as a shorthand to denote this.
However, since feminist scientists have provided a rich
body of scholarship in this area, I will also allude to it
directly.
2. See, for example, Blanchard (1989) on defining "true
transsexuals" and Hooker (1963) on "pure
homosexuals."
3. See, for example, Moore and Travis 2000 on the
"gay brain;" and Conrad and Markens 2001, and Miller
1995 on the "gay gene."
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